The 3 Categories of Gittin

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The 3 Categories of Gittin

Introduction

The common logic of the conventional, recognized cultures of today conflicts with the Jewish understanding of marriage and divorce. Most Jews don’t even know the fundamental differences between the distinct categories of Gittin or how many categories there are. They instantly assume that if a man doesn’t give a גט on demand, then he is abusing his wife by not giving her a Gett. However, this is a very biased assumption to make and there’s many sources that contradict this notion.

In the Talmud of כתובות on page 77a, it states the different categories that a גט can be classified under. These categories are have specific criteria, and one should not manipulate the details that affect the classification process because doing so could lead to the serious sin of adultery if the גט is invalid…

Category 1: Kofin LeGaresh

The first type of גט is the category in which the rabbis can force a גט if there are physical defects that make it impossible for the wife to live with him. Such disabilities make it impossible for him to fulfill the obligations of the כתובה.

The specific circumstances that this gemara mentions include the case where the husband has a job which causes him to smell bad (tanner, etc.), and the wife can not appreciate it. The Mishnah states “כופין אותו” – “compel him”. The sages then discuss the different means to which the גט can be coerced. They do not all claim violence in such cases. In this case, it doesn’t have the status of “Gett Meusah” because there’s justification for the dissolution of the marriage.

Such cases are incredibly rare. They are very specific in nature, and these policies are not altered even today. This strict opinion on not changing the criteria for כופין אותו is reinforced by the commentary of Tosafot in Ketubot 70A (d”h Yotzi), Rashba 1:572, Teshuvot HaRosh 43:3, and the Shulkhan Arukh: Even HaEzer 154:5. 

Despite the harsh statement condoning the use of coercion, we do not force the husband to divorce his wife if he claims he is willing to give a גט. He can even say that he will give it provided that his reasonable requests are met. This is stated by the Rosh, Sefer Knesset Hagedolah, Dvar Emes, Oneg Yomtov, and Yitzhak Amarsham.

But in the cases that fall under Category 1, if the husband is able to change himself (meet her demands) and says he will do so, then he can not be forced to divorce his wife (add source). This is how a marital issue is reconciled. The concept of Shalom Bayit (שלום בית) means “Peace in The Home”. This implies doing things that would preserve the marriage. It also implies that if the husband wants שלום but the wife does not, then we still do not force him to give a גט . We still suggest שלום בית if it’s possible because even the altar in the Holy Temple cries when a divorce takes place (Gittin 90b). Divorce should not be one’s first option under normal circumstances. Rav Avigdor Miller said that divorce is a sin which necessary in some cases (Tape #206).

Category 2: Khiyuv Aval Ein Kofin

The second גט category which the Mishnah discusses is when the husband can be “suggested” to divorce his wife but can not force him to divorce. In the same Mishnah (Ketubot 77a) that discusses when a גט can be forced, it states the next category:  “חיוב לגרש אבל אין כופים אותו” – “Obligated to divorce but not compel him”. That means that even though it is necessary, if not a Mitzvah, for him to divorce her, we do not force him to do so.

The causes for this case have to do with things that would make things difficult for a woman to live with but not severe enough for coercion to be applied. These causes  include being married for 10 years with no children or if the man admits that he can not perform reproductive acts. He is obligated and encouraged to give a גט but is not forced to do so.

If the case is classified under the second category, then his refusal to give a גט can lead to non-coercive measures that may incentivize giving a גט. The Rem”A cites the Rabbeinu Tam who said that the community could practice Meniat Tovah (מניעת טובה) – cessation of good [deeds] or withholding of certain favors. The favors included under “מניעת טובה” include buying from him, selling to him, and lending him money. These restrictions are called “Harḥakot” (הרחקות). These social restrictions could only be applied in the town where the couple is living in AND if the man refused a גט while having the option to move to another town. The specific parameters for מניעת טובה, as promoted by Rabbeinu Tam, are also stated by Rav Binyamin Zev, Maharik, Levush, the Vilna Gaon, Tzemach Tzedek, and Igores Moshe.

None of these הרחקות apply if he said he is willing to give a גט (as seen in the first category) because if the more severe category of Gittin can not be forced if the husband merely agrees to give a גט, then all-the-more-so, we would not coerce him with מניעת טובה in this second (less severe) category if he is willing to go give it. So by no means, would we apply הרחקות on a man who is willing to give this type of גט.

Rabbeinu Tam (Sefer HaYashar 77) said that the מניעת טובה had to be done indirectly. The community would not be allowed to mention that these social restrictions are because of a גט. This is agreed upon by the Poskim – Rabbis who legislate Jewish law in post-Talmud times. These poskim include the Maharashdam, Mahara Sasson, Macharash, Aderet Eliyahu, Beis Shmuel, Radbaz, Mishpat Tzedek, and Rabbi Akiva Eiger Z”L.

The הרחקות of Rabbeinu Tam did not promote any public call to action (protests and petitions) in the case where מניעת טובה has been applied. Creating a campaign against a husband, for the sake of procuring a גט, is equivalent to public humiliation which is considered a form of coercion and would invalidate a גט. This is according to the following poskim: Ha-Rav Yosef Karo (Even HaEzer 154:21), Rem”A, Rashba (7:414), Rashbash, Radvaz (IV:118), Mahrashdam (Yoreh De’ah 106), Ritvaz, Berach Yitzhak, HaGam Shaul, Betzel HaKesef, and Chazon Ish (108:12).

Nowadays, in a world where information spreads rapidly (via digital media), the הרחקות of Rabbeinu Tam is an issue because if it is applied, then he can not escape this due to the fact that the information will be present in all communities when historically, this was only applied to the actual town the man is from. Therefore, it is now forbidden to practice the הרחקות of Rabbeinu Tam today as these practices would be considered a form of blatant coercion. The idea that these social restrictions are invalid is reinforced by the Rem”A, Pischei Teshuvah (commentary on Even HaEzer 154:30), Shach, Marchash, Beis Dovid, and Nachlas Shimon.

Now, some say that these poskim are from much older generations that chose to ban הרחקות, but later generations upheld the ban of the aforementioned provisions. The later rabbis include: Mari Asad, Avni Mazer, Teshuvos Baal HaTanya, Sefer Knesset HeGedolah, Tzemach Tzedek, and Chazon Ish.

In olden times, some Jews may have lived in towns that followed Halachic opinions that were not accepted by the majority of rabbis around the world. Therefor, it is likely that some of these practices (such as הרחקות) may have been used, but take into consideration that these were not in the majority. And in a world where it is common for people to rely on rabbinic opinions of other communities, it could become an issue if the הרחקות were to become normalized globally.

It is true that The Levush says that these provisions of הרחקות should still be applied, but he is opposed by over 250 poskim. Some of these poskim include the Baal Ha-Tanya and Tzemach Tzedek who disagreed with the Levush on this matter. According to Rabbi Yaakov Ben Lev, the הרחקות are detrimental to society because they are akin to Nidui – excommunication.

Forcing a גט in Category 2 or the usage of הרחקות of Rabbeinu Tam does not call for excommunication in all aspects of life. The Modern-Orthodox Rabbis have pioneered this movement as part of the fake Jewish culture…This is a common misconception of the הרחקות of Rabbeinu Tam. These means were meant to incentivize him to give a גט.

Category 3: Patur LeGaresh

The third type of גט is “Patur LeGaresh” (פטור לגרש) where the husband has no obligation to give a Get. The majority of divorces today are in this category. And enforcing מניעת טובה in the case of פטור לגרש can never be applied according to the Rem”A who cites the Shulkhan Arukh  (Even Ha-Ezer 77:3 and 154:21). This is also stated in Teshuvos HaRosh 43:6.This is [obviously] because he is not obligated to give it.

Public humiliation is forbidden in the second and third categories of Gittin since we don’t force a Gett.
Once the call is made within the classification of the 3rd category, then it can not be forced under any circumstances.

So if such a category exists, then we would assume that we would know what falls into this category. In theory, the concept of “hating” a spouse is derived from the phrase “Mais Alai” (מאיס עלי) which literally translates to “repulsive upon me” (Ketubot 63b). A husband is not obligated to divorce her in all cases of מאיס עלי, and if a גט is in Category 3, then he does not have to pay for her to forfeit the כתובה if she initiated with divorce proCommentaryceedings (add source).  In the gemara (ibid. 63b), Mar Zutra does not say that he should give a גט. There have been discussions, for thousands of years, about whether or not one can force a גט in the case of מאיס עלי. This topic is still being discussed to this day. The Gedolei Yisrael are still trying to make sure that this issue is managed properly.

Let’s turn back the clock to Medieval Times. The Tosafot write in detail about the dangers of forcing a גט. Their commentary on Ketubot 63b explicitly states that we must not add more exceptions to the cases where we can coerce a גט as that could lead to many other sins. In fact, even the Rambam’s commentary on ibid 63b limits the usage of coercing the husband in the case of מאיס עלי. The Teshuvot Ha-Rosh wrote, in a commentary on ibid 63b that in the time of the Geonim, the Jewish women were decent, but some were becoming bad. Thus, the leniency to force a גט, in the case of מאיס עלי, could be applied, but by the time of the Rishonim, the level of the women was much lower. This is why the Rosh did not believe in forcing a גט in the case of מאיס עלי because too many women would take advantage of this…

Most of today’s divorces are in the category of פטור לגרש. Thus, the usage of מאיס עלי can not include the cases of כופין אותו, and therefor, coercion can not be used for creating most גיטין in present-day times. Rabbeinu Tam even forbids suggesting a גט in this case (Ketubot 64b d”h ונכתב רבנו יונה). In our times, Rav Elyashiv ZT”L said that there is no “mitzvah” to give a גט in the case of מאיס עלי (Rav Elyashiv Kovetz Teshuvos 1:174). He has written a letter in protest of improper forms of coercion.

If he is not obligated to divorce her, he can remarry another woman without needing the heter to remarry (ibid 63b) because she is rebelling (מורדת) against him, and on every Shabbos, she can be publicly called out for her rebellious behavior. The term “Moredet (מורדת) refers to a rebellious woman.

Mesorah: Real Tradition vs Social Changes

Rav Avigdor Miller once said: “If people have wrong attitudes or wrong deeds, you have to say so, why not? Let say, if people in America, let’s say Modern Orthodox Jews, who come together with agunos agunah conventions, so you say טפשאי אמריקנה הני, “Those foolish Americans.” They come together and praise all the agunos. Some of these agunos are self-made agunos. How did they become agunos? She gets angry at her husband, and she calls in the police. So she drives her husband out of the house, and the police issue an Order a Protection. She throws her husband out of the house. Should he be happy? Certainly he doesn’t want to give her a gett. I don’t blame him. “It’s my house.” She drove him out of his house.” -Tape # E-234

With the rise of Female Empowerment, there has been an increase in the manipulation of הלכה to unjustly favor women in many ways. The most damaging example is that they are allowing the power of a גט to be completely turned around to solely benefit them. Liberal Jewish women have become convinced that the power of a unilateral divorce is in their hands. According to הלכה, it is not. The Torah does not change merely because modern society wants it too.

Unfortunately, the situation is worse because some of these “Agunah” organizations manipulate the very term “Agunah” and are going beyond הלכה causing women to be given a גט מעושה which makes it פסוּל – invalid. Thus, she is still married to her husband, and if she is with another man after this גט is given, then she is committing adultery which can make them כרת from the World to Come.

Since Orthodox Jewish culture is male-dominated, how exactly do these Feminist organizations find a way to advertise and justify their campaign? The way in which these Agunah organizations (such as ORA) promote their cause is by finding rabbanim (rabbis) who know of the rare Talmudic cases where a גט can be forced but manipulate the language and context of the cases in order to increase the number of divorce documents being written. The Jewish Feminists rely on poskim who are outliers whose opinions are not normative הלכה. Many of these Feminists have found poskim whose very ideas are heretical when it comes to the matters of divorce. The manipulation of הלכה has been a common practice because many contemporary “rabbis” try promote the usage of הרחקות on a regular basis to men who justifiably deny their wife a גט even though we know that the הרחקות are not applicable or an acceptable way to create a גט that is valid.

It should be noted that when the Rambam claims that a גט can be “compelled” on a man, the traditional definition of an עגונה does not include the selfish women who violate the Torah by litigating her husband in secular court and take away his rights to visit their kid(s). This means that using quotes from the Rambam, as a way to a promote the idea of a coerced Gett  (גט מעושה), is actually a misuse of the Rambam’s teachings.

The Rambam promotes the idea of כופין אותו or “Kefiyeh” (כפייה) – “to compel”. In the modern world, where most self-proclaimed עגונות are not authentic in their status, so the concept of כפייה does not apply. So a “compelled Get” is a גט מעושה and is therefore pasul (פסוּל) – invalid.

The Rambam’s concept of כפייה comes from the Mishnah in כתובות. We mentioned earlier that in Ketubot 77a, discusses whether or not a גט מעושה is allowed. The sages did not want us to add on more exceptions to the ability to force a גט.

The sages did not have unanimous opinions on the the usage of כפייה. They did not agree on what cases call for כפייה, and even in the cases where they do, they do not generally resort to using violence as a means כפייה.

The contemporary culture will misuse the Rambam’s promotion of כפייה because they twist his words out of its original context. In the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah (Hilchot Gerushin 2:20), he claims that a man would want to divorce his wife but that the Yetzer Hara (evil inclination) is preventing him from doing so, therefore, physical force is justified in forcing him to divorce his wife. The Rambam was specifically inferring that violence is for the case of “כופין אותו” where it was mentioned by the Sages (Ketubot 77a). This excludes the majority of today’s divorce cases.

During the era of the RambaM, many of the other rabbinic authorities disagreed with the Rambam on this matter and did not apply the Rambam’s statement. The Rishonim are the rabbanim from the years 1,000-1,5000 CE which includes the era of the RambaM, but they did not believe in forcing divorce in the cases where a wife merely [claims that she] hates her husband. Most of them held that forcing a Get, under these circumstances, was wrong.

Many of the poskim, in cities influenced by the Rambam, did not follow his ruling when it came to כפייה. Most of his contemporaries disagreed with him on this matter. These Rishonim who disagreed with using כפייה in the case of מאיס עלי include Rabbeinu Tam and the other Tosafot as well as Ha-Rav Yosef Karo, the Magid Mishnah, The Mordechai, Maharam, Rosh, RashbA, RambaN, Ritva, and the RaN. These Rishonim did not believe that the Rambam’s opinion on כפייה  could be properly followed. Even in contemporary times, the Chazon Ish opposed כפייה (Hilchos Gittin 108). No authentic, contemporary posek supports כפייה. The Gedolei Yisrael, even in our generation, are against Get Coercion.

Even Ha-Ezer 77:1 states that בית דין can apply financial coercion in the case of a man who refuses to have relations with his wife because he despises her (מאיס עלי) but is not actively divorcing her. The rabbis have a way of properly dealing with men who do not give a Gett in the cases where he would be obligated to do so, and we do not need any Halachic innovations to deal with this.

On the other hand, some women rebel against their husbands. They want to divorce because they claim to “hate” their husband. These women are not entitled to immediately receive a Gett. She is denied it for years and receives no money when the Ketubah is forfeited. Public proclamations are made about her rebellious behavior (Ibid. 77:2). According to Rabbi Menasheh Klein (Mishneh Halachos Helek 17 Siman 83), if a wife causes damage to her husband via civil courts, then he is never obligated to return to the religious court until the damages are restored. There are 30 poskim that claim that a husband can remarry if a wife is actively doing this.

In the 18th-Century, Rabbi Yehezkel Landau wrote a commentary on the Shulkhan Arukh called “Noda BeYehuda”. In his commentary on Even Ha-Ezer, he states that a husband can not be forced to give a גט even if he is not living with his wife. This is stated in the Noda BeYehudah – Even Ha-Ezer Teshuvah 90. A woman is not entitled to a גט merely because she does not want to be live with her husband.

The social systems of the Western world have turned our women into spoiled, rotten animals who demand things that our tradition does not entitle them to. It is our fault for not raising them right. Thus, the divine punishment of their rebellion is occuring.In 15th Century Algeria, the Yachin uVoaz (1:124) said:

“You should know that there are two different types of moredet and they have different laws. There is a moredet who despises her husband and she asserts that he is disgusting to her. On the other hand there is a moredes who says she wants her husband but she wants to torment him. In the case of מאיס עלי, the view of the Rambam is that the husband is forced to divorce her immediately and he learns this from a deduction from the gemara as the Rosh writes.

The Rambam states in Hilchot Ishut  (14:8) that if a wife refuses to have relations with her husbands, then her husband is forced to give a a gett since she is not like a prisoner who can be forced to have relations with someone she hates. However, there has long been an outcry against the ruling of the Rambam by all the commentators and poskim such as Rabbein Tam, RambaN, Rosh, Rashba, and many others. They agree concerning forcing the husband to divorce. Whoever forces the husband to divorce in accordance to the ruling of the Rambam increases mamzerim in the world. And they reject the view of the Rambam with clear proofs from the Talmud as the Rosh does. And many proofs are brought to refute and reject the words of the Rambam. And even the Magid Mishnah who normally devotes  himself in all places to justify the words of the Rambam and to firmly establish their validity with clear proofs – in this case he refutes the Rambam and goes into detail with proofs to contradict the Rambam’s reasoning and to reject it. It is unnecessary to repeat them here. The halachic view that has become universal is that one does not force the husband to give a get when she claim מאיס עלי and we do not rely on the ruling of the Rambam nor others who agree with him in this matter.” -1:124

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